Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. My presentation today poses the question: What can illicit arms transfers tell us about sovereignty?
To answer this question I will review some prevailing theories and classifications of sovereignty and provide you some background information on both the arms trade and the Balkan conflict. Finally, I will apply these theories to information I have gathered about illicit arms transfers during the 1990’s violence in the former Yugoslavia. I conclude that, contrary to some sovereignty theory currently on the market, non-state actors, in this case, possessed little inherent power. Their growth was not spurred by the absence of the state, but instead was directly encouraged through the actions of states.
Recently, a lot of attention has been focused on the power of non-state actors in global politics. Moises Naim, in his 2005 book Illicit, sets forth a series of cautionary tales describing how crime has used the powers of globalization to supersede the powers of states. In his survey of applicable international relations theory, Naim discusses the perspectives of Realism, Liberalism, and Idealism. His definitions are as follows: Realism dictates that if you want to “predict a country’s international actions, look at its needs and compare its military might with that of other countries. This will tell you more about its likely behavior than any statement its leaders might make.” Liberalism, on the other hand, assigns more importance to factors such as commerce, democracy, and international institutions, which discourage aggressive actions against other nations. Finally, Idealism “emphasizes the role of beliefs, ideas, culture, narratives, and social identities in the shaping the behavior of nation-states and the elites that lead them.”
The inception of traditional national sovereignty is often traced to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This peace was the summation of a series of treaties that affirmed the nation-state as the supreme level of government, subservient to no higher power. The Westphalian concept has dominated foreign policy ever since. However, doubts have been raised about the Westphalian State’s utility in modern society, and its very existence called into question. John Agnew, in a 2005 article entitled Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, argues that governments require communication and infrastructure resources combined with a public cooperation, to successfully exert sovereignty. Globalization, therefore, continually erodes national sovereignty because the related policy and infrastructure necessitates shared and decentralized rule. He states:
…the dominant Westphalian model of state sovereignty in political geography and international relations theory, deficient as it has long been for understanding the realities of world politics, is even more inadequate today…
While both Dr. Naim and Dr. Agnews statements about the limitations of state sovereignty are insightful, they do not fit well with the clear domination individual nations exercised over the arms market during the Balkan crisis.
In September 1991, the UN Security Council passed resolution 713 which required member states to cease military assistance to the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, in response to the rising violence in the region. However, since this resolution lacked any provision for enforcement it was widely violated. Moreover, it actually intensified the demand for weapons because combatants feared a latter plan of enforcement might be crafted. It was during this time that Iran began seeking a supplying relationship with the Bosnian Muslims. Before resolution 781 took effect in the fall of 1992, Tehran made several attempts at delivering arms to ABiH. Resolution 781, better known as the “No Fly resolution”, prohibited all non-military flights over Bosnia that lacked previous approval. However, once again, the bill lacked any provisions for enforcement. It would not be until March of 1993, which marked the passage of resolution 816, that any tangible consequences would be applied.
The United States, as a member of NATO and the UN, was bound to enforce the arms embargo in both the airspace above the conflict, and at sea through its naval counterpart, Operation Sharp Guard. However, early in the Clinton administration, US commitment to the embargo began to waiver under domestic and foreign pressures. For one, Saudi Arabia was compelling Washington to provide some support to the ABiH as repayment for the Kingdom’s assistance during the Gulf War. Furthermore, the President had made the previous administration’s indifference to the Bosnian plight a central campaign issue.
When US attempts at persuading fellow NATO members to drop the arms embargo failed, the US gave tacit support to the resumption of Iranian supply lines to Bosnia. To avoid the embargo, all weapons were first transferred to Croatia, and then relayed to Bosnia. Croatia found this relationship agreeable despite previous conflict between the two countries; ferrying the weapons allowed them to skim off roughly 30 percent for their own defense needs.
The US involvement in enforcing the arms embargo further disintegrated in November 1994 when Congress passed a law prohibiting the use of government funds to enforce the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. Consequently, American ships no longer inspected incoming vessels as part of Operation Sharp Guard and intelligence regarding incoming weapons shipments was no longer relayed to NATO. It was Washington’s policy that the arms embargo would not be lifted (Due to the intense objections of UNPROFOR members) but that the US would no longer contribute to its enforcement.
Whether the US initiated a more active role in the supply chain has been the subject of some debate. We know that Washington became increasingly wary of the influence that Tehran was gaining among the Bosnian and Croatian leadership. But to remove Iran from the supply chain, the US would have to absorb all the Bosnian’s demand for weapons and provide something the Iranians could not; delivery right to the Bosnian’s doorstep. A flurry of suspicious activity surrounding an air strip near the Bosnian town of Tuzla, and a sudden increase in the sophistication of ABiH weapons caused many countries to suspect that a US covert operation was in progress. Beginning in 1995, non-American UN observers noted numerous night appearances of unidentifiable C-130 aircraft approaching Tuzla at a low altitude. Curiously, the flights only seemed to occur when there were no surveillance aircraft in the sky or when the flights were manned by American crews. Many observers point out that it is unlikely that the US would have “blinded” its surveillance to an Iranian operation. Given the capabilities required to subvert the “no fly zone”, some level of direct American involvement is likely. Witnesses of the Tuzla flights state that the C-130s made aerial drops of their cargo, which technically supports the US assertion that no American aircraft ‘landed’ at Tuzla.
Whether the US initiated a more active role in the supply chain has been the subject of some debate. We know that Washington became increasingly wary of the influence that Tehran was gaining among the Bosnian and Croatian leadership. But to remove Iran from the supply chain, the US would have to absorb all the Bosnian’s demand for weapons and provide something the Iranians could not; delivery right to the Bosnian’s doorstep. A flurry of suspicious activity surrounding an air strip near the Bosnian town of Tuzla, and a sudden increase in the sophistication of ABiH weapons caused many countries to suspect that a US covert operation was in progress. Beginning in 1995, non-American UN observers noted numerous night appearances of unidentifiable C-130 aircraft approaching Tuzla at a low altitude. Curiously, the flights only seemed to occur when there were no surveillance aircraft in the sky or when the flights were manned by American crews. Many observers point out that it is unlikely that the US would have “blinded” its surveillance to an Iranian operation. Given the capabilities required to subvert the “no fly zone”, some level of direct American involvement is likely. Witnesses of the Tuzla flights state that the C-130s made aerial drops of their cargo, which technically supports the US assertion that no American aircraft ‘landed’ at Tuzla.
In this case, it seems that the realist perspective triumphs, as the US’s actions were best predicted by its needs and strength. Of course, it is clear that nations do not always behave in an overtly realist manner. To explain the selective adherence to sovereignty norms, author Stephen Krasner proposes that, a nation’s policy tendencies are a dichotomous construct built of the logic of appropriateness and the logic consequences. The Logic of appropriateness dictates that actions are taken in accordance with the expectations of the office. On the other hand, the logic of consequences is used when seeking to maximize a set of unspecified preferences which may be ancillary to the policy decision at hand. Krasner suggests that if the roles and rules of a given situation are clear, and the consequences of alternative actions are ambiguous, leaders will generally act within the expectations of their office. However, if the actors are engaged in situations where roles are contradictory or ill-defined, and the consequences of alternative actions clear, the logic of consequences will be applied. Given these definitions, it we can assume that the bulk of foreign relations are conducted within the logic of consequences – and this seems especially true in the case of the Balkan case.
Non-state actors were successful in moving weapons due to the intermittent enforcement by the occupying international forces. When the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 an estimated 1.5 million weapons were looted from police stations and military depots. As the Kosovo and Macedonian rebels armament efforts drove up demand, Albanians who had stockpiled these weapons are said to have made 500 to 1,000 percent profits. In 1998 it was estimated that close to 400,000 Albanian rifles had been smuggled to Kosovo. However, many accounts suggest that weapons were successful in reaching Kosovo only due to the silent support of US personnel patrolling the borders. The private American intelligence company Stratfor, went as far as to call the Kosovo Liberation Army “an American proxy”.
Non-state actors were successful in moving weapons due to the intermittent enforcement by the occupying international forces. When the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 an estimated 1.5 million weapons were looted from police stations and military depots. As the Kosovo and Macedonian rebels armament efforts drove up demand, Albanians who had stockpiled these weapons are said to have made 500 to 1,000 percent profits. In 1998 it was estimated that close to 400,000 Albanian rifles had been smuggled to Kosovo. However, many accounts suggest that weapons were successful in reaching Kosovo only due to the silent support of US personnel patrolling the borders. The private American intelligence company Stratfor, went as far as to call the Kosovo Liberation Army “an American proxy”.
Other arms transfers involving non-state actors capitalized on the enormous surplus of weapons that remained as the conflict dissipated. Small arms are durable goods and are frequently recycled through several conflicts. Here are a few examples: One of the more widely reported stories of gun-running in the Bosnian aftermath was the revelation of an arms pipeline connecting Croatia and the Real Irish Republican Army. Weapons were ferried across from various small and poorly monitored ports on the Dalmatian coast to Italy, then through the EU and on to Ireland.
In 2001 a Spanish television channel went undercover to document a similar but more complex and audacious Balkan smuggling ring. Representatives from El Mundo TV, posing as potential clients, struck up a relationship with associates of infamous arms dealer and war crime defendant, Radovan Karadzic. The reporters were offered everything from light attack helicopters and armored cars to extensive stockpiles of small arms and explosives. Illustrating the diversification of Adriatic Black Market, half the payment was to be made in cocaine. During the negotiations, the traffickers boasted that their outfit had shipped arms via Kosovo, Croatia, to countries around the globe.
In situations such as Bosnia and Kosovo, I conclude that powerful states, such as the US, exhibit extreme individual power. The current modus operandi of foreign relations prescribes vague parameters of conduct, in which the logic of consequences continues to prevail. The abilities of non-state actors involved in the weapons trade are fairly insignificant…until they are magnified by the actions of states. Although, I have endorsed the realist perspective and the “logic of consequences” as explanations of these events I want to point out a troublesome contradiction: If the logic of consequences dictated that the US could appease the Saudis by supporting the Bosnians there were two options available, 1) Covertly arm the ABiH either indirectly or directly or 2) Directly intervene on the Bosnians behalf, as became the reality with the NATO bombing campaign in 1995. Given these two choices it seems that the covert arms pipeline contained many more negative consequences than did direct intervention. Through covertly arming the Bosnian Army the US would allow Iran to gain political influence in Southeastern Europe, create an excess supply of arms on the black market, and therefore provide a network for other illicit activities such as drug smuggling. Additionally, author Cees Wiebes convincingly argues that few US policy-makers seemed to seriously believe that the ABiH could effectively use those weapons to repel Serbian attacks – making direct intervention a likely scenario. So why incur all those risks in the face of an inevitable outcome? The realist perspective does not provide an adequate answer to this question. However, idealist theory can gain traction on this ground. The principle reason for avoiding direct intervention in the Balkans was US fixation on the Vietnam narrative, no matter how inapplicable it was to the given situation. Gearoid O Tuathail, in his book Critical Geopolitics summarizes the US post-Vietnam military mantra as, and I am paraphrasing, “we don’t do jungles or mountains”. I mention this to point out that there is no set category to define every nuance of the state’s actions. What I can say with certainty at this point is, despite all the attention given to amorphous and powerful criminal networks, non-state actors in my chosen case were only empowered through the actions of states…not their absence. Thank you for your attention.
In situations such as Bosnia and Kosovo, I conclude that powerful states, such as the US, exhibit extreme individual power. The current modus operandi of foreign relations prescribes vague parameters of conduct, in which the logic of consequences continues to prevail. The abilities of non-state actors involved in the weapons trade are fairly insignificant…until they are magnified by the actions of states. Although, I have endorsed the realist perspective and the “logic of consequences” as explanations of these events I want to point out a troublesome contradiction: If the logic of consequences dictated that the US could appease the Saudis by supporting the Bosnians there were two options available, 1) Covertly arm the ABiH either indirectly or directly or 2) Directly intervene on the Bosnians behalf, as became the reality with the NATO bombing campaign in 1995. Given these two choices it seems that the covert arms pipeline contained many more negative consequences than did direct intervention. Through covertly arming the Bosnian Army the US would allow Iran to gain political influence in Southeastern Europe, create an excess supply of arms on the black market, and therefore provide a network for other illicit activities such as drug smuggling. Additionally, author Cees Wiebes convincingly argues that few US policy-makers seemed to seriously believe that the ABiH could effectively use those weapons to repel Serbian attacks – making direct intervention a likely scenario. So why incur all those risks in the face of an inevitable outcome? The realist perspective does not provide an adequate answer to this question. However, idealist theory can gain traction on this ground. The principle reason for avoiding direct intervention in the Balkans was US fixation on the Vietnam narrative, no matter how inapplicable it was to the given situation. Gearoid O Tuathail, in his book Critical Geopolitics summarizes the US post-Vietnam military mantra as, and I am paraphrasing, “we don’t do jungles or mountains”. I mention this to point out that there is no set category to define every nuance of the state’s actions. What I can say with certainty at this point is, despite all the attention given to amorphous and powerful criminal networks, non-state actors in my chosen case were only empowered through the actions of states…not their absence. Thank you for your attention.
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